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DATA AND DEMOCRACY

Transparency's
AI Problem
By Hannah Bloch-Wehba

In October 2020, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University convened a virtual symposium, titled “Data and Democracy,” to
investigate how technological advances relating to the collection, analysis, and manipulation of data are affecting democratic processes, and
how the law must adapt to ensure the conditions for self-government. This
symposium was organized by the Institute’s 2019-2020 Senior Visiting
Research Scholar, Yale Law Professor Amy Kapczynski, and co-sponsored
by the Law and Political Economy Project at Yale Law School.
The essays in this series were originally presented and discussed at this
two-day event. Written by scholars and experts in law, computer science,
information studies, political science, and other disciplines, the essays
focus on three areas that are both central to democratic governance and
directly affected by advancing technologies and ever-increasing data
collection: 1) public opinion formation and access to information; 2) the
formation and exercise of public power; and 3) the political economy of
data.
The symposium was conceptualized by Knight Institute staff, including
Jameel Jaffer, Executive Director; Katy Glenn Bass, Research Director;
Amy Kapczynski, Senior Visiting Research Scholar; Alex Abdo, Litigation
Director; and Larry Siems, Chief of Staff. The essay series was edited by
Glenn Bass with additional support from Lorraine Kenny, Communications Director; A. Adam Glenn, Writer/Editor; and Madeline Wood,
Communications and Research Coordinator.
The full series is available at knightcolumbia.org/research/

A

INTRODUCTION

rtificial intelligence has a serious transparency problem. AI
is transforming governance, but its outcomes are difficult to explain,
and its processes impossible for lay users to understand.1 What’s
more, the AI tools governments increasingly rely upon to automate decision
making are often procured from private sector vendors, compounding the
public’s inability to ascertain what it is, exactly, that government is doing
when it uses AI. Together, these two features have led scholars to critically
assess the transparency and accountability of AI tools and techniques, and to
try to improve AI’s design and performance to satisfy these essential values.2
Yet there is little consensus on what algorithmic transparency actually
means. In a technical sense, experts have described AI’s machinations and
determinations as “opaque” because they are difficult to explain or to articulate, even to experts.3 But even systems that are technically transparent can
remain opaque in a legal and political sense. Automated decision systems are
often procured in secret or with limited public oversight. Open-government
obligations like the Freedom of Information Act and state public records
laws do not directly reach the private sector vendors that supply AI/ML technology to the government. Today, private companies hold a near-monopoly
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on critical information about the ethical, legal, political, and technological
ramifications of AI, with few concomitant responsibilities to release it to
the public.4
Government and public institutions’ use of automation thus fosters
opacity on two basic levels: the technical and the political-economic. At least
in theory, innovation can address—to a greater or lesser extent—technical
barriers to transparency.5 But the central role that law affords the private
sector in developing and implementing AI in government bears equal responsibility for opacity as does technical sophistication.
Insulating private vendors from scrutiny produces negative consequences for democracy. We need to know what automated decision systems
governments are using, how they work, and what their effects on individuals
and society are. Without some baseline level of public-facing transparency,
democratic principles of control and participation become elusive. But at
precisely the same moment at which calls for algorithmic transparency and
accountability are reaching a fever pitch, we have contracted out substantial
portions of public governance to a virtually unregulated industry that operates largely in the shadows. This industry itself wields substantial influence
in crafting arguments about the rightful scope and extent of transparency
obligations, and the gaming, secrecy, and commercial interests on the other
side of the balance.
This essay begins to sketch an agenda for rendering this private control
transparent and accountable to the public. I argue for direct and meaningful
algorithmic transparency obligations to be imposed upon private vendors
that supply AI tools to government actors. I highlight the importance of
grounding those obligations in principles of direct participation and community control in governance, rather than in elite and technocratic modes of
oversight.6 In so doing, the essay adds to a body of work that considers how
technology companies function as participants in our governance arrangements.7 It also contributes to a long-standing conversation about whether
and how to extend public law obligations to private actors.8
After briefly outlining the conceptual underpinnings of the freedom of
information regime and its theoretical relationship to democratic participation and accountability, Part I maps out current approaches to algorithmic
transparency in government. I show that, in the context of government’s use
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of algorithms, open government falls short of its goals to promote information-sharing or good governance. Partly in response to these shortcomings,
efforts to promote transparency in AI have shifted from a focus on disclosing the source code and data for AI tools to a focus on broader concepts of
accountability and the right to an explanation. Core concepts of “accountability” and “transparency” familiar from open-government contexts are
being contested, reimagined, and redefined. These methods of promoting
algorithmic transparency—while essential—are not substitutes for transparency law itself, because they fail to extend the participatory democratic
values that animated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Part II examines how the high stakes of automated decision making
in criminal law enforcement—and the increasingly urgent calls for direct
democratic participation—illustrate the limits of a technocratic approach
to algorithmic accountability and transparency. When lives are on the line,
demands that the affected individuals and communities should be given a
meaningful voice in policy increase. In these contexts, assurances of fairness,
accountability, and justice from private sector vendors are widespread, but
simply not sufficient to persuade the public or assuage concerns. In response,
new ex ante modes of accountability are emerging to guard against abuses
and to bolster community participation and input.
Part III concludes with three proposals for how states and governments
could enhance algorithmic transparency. In particular, governments can
extend public values to private vendors through contracting and procurement reform. These proposals would allow government agencies to consider
vendors’ commitments to openness in the contracting process, alongside
the dollar figure of their bids. They would also allow government agencies
to begin a more aggressive push toward openness in automated decision
making by conditioning contracts on data-sharing obligations. While these
approaches have several drawbacks, their benefits include a fidelity to the
presumption of democratic participation and democratization of data that
underlies the open-government framework.
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I. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN A CHANGING WORLD
Transparency law’s democratic roots
Transparency has long been an integral aspect of administrative accountability. When Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act in 1966, it
intended to “pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency
action to the light of public scrutiny.”9 FOIA was a direct legislative response
to an administrative state that had become increasingly shadowy.10 While
FOIA has come to occupy a central role in scholarly thinking about transparency law, all 50 states have also enacted their own public records statutes,
many of which are patterned after FOIA.11
In brief, FOIA and its state equivalents impose a general rule that government records ought to be open to the public.12 Instead of designating certain
categories of records as public, FOIA exhibited a presumption of disclosure
upon request, subject to certain exemptions that were to be construed narrowly.13 Those exemptions include carve outs for properly classified information, records subject to statutory secrecy requirements, trade secrets,
privileged information, personnel and medical files, and records compiled
for law enforcement purposes.14
FOIA differed from other transparency obligations imposed by the regulatory state—its transparency mandate was oriented toward the public. While
a wide variety of regulatory frameworks require private industry to disclose
information to regulators, FOIA requires the government to disclose information to anyone who asks. As Margaret Kwoka has shown, FOIA was “designed
by journalists, for journalists,” in keeping with theories of democracy that
placed the press at the center of democratic self-governance.15 Other disclosure obligations operate quite differently. Regulatory monitors, for instance,
can compel firms to disclose information to government agencies, even apart
from any specific investigation of a firm.16 These disclosure arrangements are
essential to the promotion of effective administrative oversight and expert
regulation. But unlike FOIA, these other disclosure arrangements were never
intended to promote effective public participation in democratic governance.
In several ways, FOIA and its state equivalents fall short of the goals
of promoting democratic self-governance and government accountability.
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First, FOIA left private industry largely beyond the reach of its disclosure
obligations—and private power thus mostly undisturbed.17 The statute’s
inadequate ability to reach private enterprise has dismayed observers at least
since the early 2000s, particularly in the context of increasingly privatized
military and security functions.18 Amid widespread contracting-out by government, the divergence between the extensive transparency obligations
borne by government agencies and the minimal ones incurred by private
enterprise has resulted in a growing blind spot that at times undermines
FOIA’s chief objectives.19 A large body of literature has raised significant
questions about how privatization might deleteriously affect public values
such as accountability and transparency.20 The most direct and obvious
transparency obstacle is imposed by FOIA’s failure to reach much important
information that is either shared by or remains in the hands of the private
sector. For instance, in 2003, when seven crew members aboard the space
shuttle Columbia died as their vessel disintegrated upon re-entering the
atmosphere, NASA fielded dozens of FOIA requests related to the disaster.21
But the records held by United Space Alliance—a joint enterprise of Boeing
and Lockheed Martin that was the contractor with major responsibility
for the shuttle—were off-limits because they were in the hands of a private
contractor.22
Second, and relatedly, critics of FOIA and of the “open government”
movement more generally have also observed that the statute’s presumption
of radical openness might exacerbate antagonism between the public and
government institutions, inculcating suspicion and undermining trust. By
exposing governmental wrongdoing to public scrutiny, FOIA’s structure
systematically contributes to a “mounting adversarialism” between government and citizens.23
To some degree, adversarialism can be a positive. Some amount is to
be expected when many constituencies come to the policymaking table;
indeed, adversarialism might be a critical aspect of “democratic contestation
and control.”24 Yet to the extent that transparency mechanisms reveal and
contribute to the publicity surrounding government wrongdoing, they also
focus attention and distrust on government rather than on private actors
who are systematically insulated from public view, amplifying the sense that
government alone deserves that level of scrutiny and distrust.25
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Finally, FOIA’s demands themselves are exceptionally burdensome,
and the benefits of open government are unevenly distributed. Instead of
restricting disclosure of government information to those who had “good
cause” to want it, FOIA required disclosure to “any person” who requested
the records.26 FOIA’s “entitlement” to public information has led critics to
argue that its benefits are systemically “rationed” through the litigation
process—a process that, itself, favors wealthy private actors.27 While FOIA’s
policy of disclosure to “any person” has historically been justified on the
grounds that it facilitates democratic participation in government, today
commercial enterprise represents an “overwhelming majority” of FOIA
requests, calling this justification into doubt.28 At the state and local level,
these dynamics are even more pronounced.29

Algorithmic transparency and accountability
Despite these flaws, public records laws have seemed a potentially fruitful
mechanism for gathering information about government institutions’ uses of
automation and AI.30 On one level, using public records laws to obtain access
to the instruments of algorithmic governance is appealingly straightforward:
Access to source code is often necessary to understand how an algorithm
works, and source code can be accessible in written form as a record subject
to disclosure. And in at least one recent case, public interest litigants have
succeeded in using FOIA as a mechanism to gain access to a government
algorithm, a computer model that the Environmental Protection Agency
used to set policy regarding greenhouse gas emissions.31
In other ways, however, public records statutes are proving of limited
use to advocates seeking to better understand the government’s use of AI.
Machine learning exemplifies trends toward privatization in government:
One recent study of federal agencies’ adoption of AI found that nearly half
of the 157 use cases were provided through acquisitions from commercial
vendors or partnerships between government and private enterprise.32 Efforts
to apply FOIA’s disclosure obligations directly to source code and analogous
records at the core of algorithmic governance confront head-on the pathologies of a system in which the private sector benefits from FOIA’s entitlements
while entirely avoiding its obligations.33
The law insulates the private sector from scrutiny in several respects.
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First, FOIA only applies to records that an agency “controls.”34 This “control”
requirement has often been interpreted to mean that technologies licensed
to the government are beyond FOIA’s reach.35 In many cases, the vendor
of an algorithmic system that is licensed to the government will continue
to “control” the source code for the tool, leaving it outside of FOIA’s reach.
In agreements with vendors, governments also sometimes promise not to
treat algorithmic tools like ordinary public records.36 Nor do governments
always control the training or input data that affect how machine-learning
algorithms learn over time or generate their outputs.37
Second, even when an agency unambiguously “controls” a software
system or data, regulated industries and private sector vendors have often
succeeded in shielding business information from public disclosure, arguing
that it constitutes trade secrets or confidential commercial information.38
FOIA’s Exemption 4 provides that the statute does not apply to “trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.”39 The technology industry has resisted calls for
algorithmic transparency, arguing that source code can be a highly protected trade secret.40 Vendors also often argue that that data itself is proprietary.41 The breadth of FOIA’s protections for trade secrets and confidential
business information is currently uncertain. On the one hand, the FOIA
Improvement Act of 2016 amended FOIA to require that an agency may only
withhold records when it “reasonably foresees” that release would cause
harm, appearing to limit agencies’ ability to withhold documents. On the
other hand, a 2019 Supreme Court case, FMI v. Argus Leader, expanded the
interpretation of the “confidential business information” exemption, fueling
efforts to conceal private sector information.42
To be sure, expansive assertions of trade secrecy and confidentiality
also impede transparency outside of the context of open government. When
litigants have sought information about algorithms procured from private
vendors to vindicate, for example, due process rights, vendors have asserted
that the algorithms are trade secrets.43 And in recent trade deals, Silicon
Valley has successfully lobbied for provisions that prevent source-code
disclosure.44 Concerns about trade secrecy have motivated scholars to try
to strike a pragmatic balance between disclosure obligations and legitimate
commercial interests.45
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FOIA’s very design may have aggravated resistance to its use as a mechanism for understanding algorithmic governance. FOIA’s widespread use
by commercial entities as a form of business intelligence-gathering, and its
policy of disclosure to any requester regardless of need, have likely contributed to aggressive efforts to maintain trade secrecy. Because FOIA requires
public information to be made available to anyone on request, the potential
costs of disclosure are high and incentivize firms to try to avoid it.
And because algorithmic systems—and the contexts in which they are
used—are complex, the value of public disclosure is not always apparent.
Many scholars of algorithmic accountability view FOIA-style public disclosure mandates as “naïve” at best and occasionally outright pernicious.46
If a key problem with AI/ML systems is that they are too complex to be
understood, the value of public disclosure is limited. Even sharp critics
of algorithmic governance have evinced skepticism about transparency
values. From a critical perspective, the idea of algorithmic transparency
isn’t just unattainable or unrealistic, but can actually serve as a dangerous
distraction from broader accountability deficits, laden with “unexamined
assumptions about the benefits of transparency, equating the ability to see
inside a system with the power to govern it.”47 As Mike Ananny and Kate
Crawford have argued, “transparency alone cannot create accountable systems”—attention must be paid to the political and social contexts in which
technical systems operate.48

From transparency to accountability
Perhaps driven in part by FOIA’s perceived failings, new approaches to
“algorithmic transparency” are surfacing that prioritize technical solutions
to opacity. At the same time as technology companies resist open-government, disclosure-based models of transparency, they have embraced a rich
parallel debate about how to make AI technically transparent.49 This debate
is important: It holds the potential to improve the way AI tools work, and the
way that they are perceived by their subjects and users. At the same time, the
framing of algorithmic transparency risks marginalizing the value of public
disclosure to participatory governance and democratic accountability.
Not surprisingly, the most aggressive reframing of transparency
norms comes from industry. Technology vendors frame accountability and
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transparency as values best achieved through technology and the private
sector itself rather than social, political, or legal principles that involve
obligations toward the broader public. From the private sector’s perspective, algorithmic transparency is a laudable goal that plays to companies’
strengths: The private sector not only occupies a central role in making
“transparency” technically achievable, but also in interpreting its core
meaning.50 Nor does the tech sector seriously address the potential clash
between transparency values and its own interests in maintaining secrecy
and confidentiality. Indeed, technology companies have successfully fought
for provisions in trade agreements that broadly protect “source code” and
“algorithms” from disclosure, even as they promise consumers that they
will work to advance transparency, accountability, and trust.51 This Janusfaced approach has garnered appropriate skepticism. As tech companies and
interest groups hire new ethics officers and adopt new ethics guidelines to
advance transparency and accountability, others have wondered whether
the moves are just window dressing.52 When it comes to accountability and
transparency, many industry promises are so vague as to be meaningless.53
Private sector influence has thus yielded deeper and less obvious problems for transparency values beyond resistance to FOIA-style disclosure
mandates. While FOIA does not extend to private contractors or vendors,
a growing appetite for transparency and accountability has led the technology sector to repurpose these terms with a competing set of definitions.
Unsurprisingly, this framing advances a different set of values than FOIA’s
emphasis on public participation and democratic self-governance.
Even outside of industry, technical approaches to algorithmic transparency have also adopted a narrower compass, avoiding implications for democratic governance. In particular, technical approaches to “explainability”
and “algorithmic accountability” largely focus on the question of how AI can
provide certain key information about how it functions, rather than the question of what kinds of public information democratic governance requires.54
Indeed, some accountability advocates have turned their noses up at
public disclosure obligations, arguing instead for more limited, alternative
“transparency” mechanisms.55 In one influential article, several authors
pushed back against the idea that transparency can be a remotely realistic
or effective mechanism for promoting accountability.56 Instead, Kroll et
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al. suggest that “accountability” means determining why a feature is necessary and explaining how its use satisfies policy goals.57
This narrower version of accountability keeps significant discretion in
the hands of algorithm developers who can satisfy “accountability” demands
by explaining their procedures without jeopardizing trade secrecy or calling
into question their other commercial interests. Having defined “accountability” in this way, it follows that a range of options for promoting transparency
and accountability—in particular, disclosure—are off the table, namely
because they don’t serve this particular kind of accountability-as-verifiability. In fact, this account seems to suggest that significant secrecy can attend
algorithmic decision making, so long as the subjects of decisions can be
adequately reassured that the rules were followed.58 Strikingly, this version
of accountability says nothing about how to achieve democratic oversight or
public participation, or otherwise guarantee that an algorithm is ultimately
“accountable“ to the public.59 The problem, then, is not simply that the private sector does not want to disclose information about AI to the public, but
that the public is notably absent from much of this robust discussion about
how best to design and implement algorithmic accountability or transparency from a technical perspective.
Instead, new ideas about algorithmic accountability and transparency
focus nearly exclusively on how technology providers can ensure that their
products don’t violate individual rights. An important related literature
explores how individuals might be able to challenge algorithmic decisions
that affect them, increasingly seeking “explainability” for the outcomes of
automated decisions.60 The so-called “right to explanation” focuses on an
individual right to have the outcome of an algorithmic process explained in
an intelligible way. In theory, at least, such a right can be vindicated without
jeopardizing trade secret or other proprietary interests—a perfect balancing
of the vendor’s commercial interest against the data subject’s dignitary one.61
Advocates of “explainability” have thus successfully expanded the project of algorithmic transparency and accountability beyond mere technical
transparency. Inadvertently, however, in so doing they have reframed the
project of algorithmic accountability as being primarily about individual
rights.62 As Margot Kaminski has noted, several of the most compelling
approaches to algorithmic accountability combine the individual rights
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approach with a more systemic approach to AI governance.63 Increasingly,
scholars are beginning to explicitly consider the role of administrative oversight and public governance in algorithmic accountability.64 Meanwhile, others continued to highlight transparency as a sometimes useful mechanism
for ensuring accountability.65 Still others have adopted more of a political
conception of accountability.66
Whatever FOIA’s drawbacks at facilitating democratic participation—
and as articulated above, there are many—these private sector norms of
accountability and transparency are even worse. Instead of positioning
transparency as a tool of democratic participation, transparency is a minimal obligation to ensure that individuals know how and when decisions are
made about them. Instead of seeing transparency as a right that effectuates a
mechanism for checking institutional malfeasance and power, transparent
AI is a promise that only powerful institutions are in a position to make.67

II. TRANSPARENCY IN HIGH-STAKES SETTINGS

I

n high-stakes settings with lives and livelihoods on the line,
promises to use technology in ways that are “transparent” and “accountable” just don’t hold up. Consider how, in 2007, Indiana privatized and
automated its system for applying for welfare benefits, resulting in more
than a million denials—many erroneous.68 Or how, in 2013, the Michigan
Unemployment Insurance Agency asked third-party technology companies
to automate the state’s application for unemployment benefits. When the
automation malfunctioned, tens of thousands of people were wrongfully
accused of fraud, and many had their wages garnished or civil penalties
imposed.69 Or how, in 2015, the West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Services relied on a proprietary algorithm to slash critical Medicaid
benefits, leaving disabled adults across the state without vital home-based
care and, instead, institutionalized in care facilities or group homes.70
In circumstances like these, democracy demands more than promises
of explainability and ethical behavior. In order to make informed decisions
about governance today, the public needs much more information about how
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these technologies operate. Instead, however, that information remains in
private hands, often as the result of efforts to conceal key information from
public view.
Nowhere is that dynamic more evident than in the context of criminal
law enforcement, where automated decision making comes with particularly
high stakes.71 Algorithms and artificial intelligence are transforming policing, enabling law enforcement to cheaply and easily use facial recognition,
gait recognition, license plate readers, gang databases, social media surveillance, predictive policing, and a range of other data-rich tools and methods.
Algorithms are also transforming pretrial release, sentencing, and parole
hearings.72 And proprietary software is increasingly used in generating
evidence used against defendants at trial.73
It is tempting to think of criminal law enforcement algorithms as the
quintessential example of “public” algorithms. But the sizable footprint of
private vendors in this sector has posed serious obstacles to efforts to make
policing more transparent and more accountable, as Elizabeth Joh has noted.74 For instance, law enforcement has obtained predictive policing algorithms from vendors such as Palantir, the shadowy surveillance company
that supplies technology to federal, state, and local governments. When
activists and advocates have sought information about these technologies,
agencies have sometimes claimed that releasing audits, test results, and
other information would violate nondisclosure agreements and jeopardize
trade secrets.75 Similarly, private vendors have invoked trade secrecy to
justify withholding the source code of a risk assessment used to sentence
an individual to prison.76
As widespread resistance to racist police violence and repression continues to sweep the nation, police technologies such as facial recognition, predictive
policing, and other surveillance technologies are coming under sustained scrutiny. Consider, for example, efforts to shed light on facial recognition and other
surveillance mechanisms. Facial recognition is a form of biometric surveillance
that identifies distinctive aspects of an individual’s facial structure and screens
those characteristics against a database of photographs. A majority of states
use facial recognition within their departments of motor vehicles, and 26 states
permit law enforcement to screen photographs of potential criminal suspects
against their DMV’s database of drivers’ license photos.77
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One major concern about facial recognition involves the potential for
racial and gender bias.78 A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) study examining the accuracy of facial recognition software
in identifying people of varied sex, age, and racial background found that
the software demonstrated higher false positive rates—the frequency of misidentifying a face as a match—for Black and Asian faces than white faces.79
Facial recognition technology also performs less accurately for “female”
faces than for “male” faces, and poorer still for dark-skinned female faces.80
A significant portion of advocacy on facial recognition has centered on
the role of private contractors, among which Amazon, owner and operator
of the Ring Video Doorbell surveillance system, is perhaps the most visible.81
While the company sells its doorbell cameras directly to consumers, Amazon also partners with hundreds of law enforcement agencies around the
country to share access to the footage and to encourage more widespread
consumer adoption.82 Amazon is also reportedly considering how to build
facial recognition into its Ring systems.83
Advocates have likely grown concerned about Clearview AI, a company
that uses a facial recognition algorithm to cross-reference a photo of an
individual against a library of images scraped from social media sites such
as Facebook and Twitter.84 In early 2020, Kashmir Hill reported that over
600 law enforcement agencies had begun using Clearview, often without
publicly disclosing it. While Clearview later announced it would stop providing the technology to private enterprise, it has continued to supply it to
law enforcement agencies.85 Other vendors have proven more susceptible to
public backlash, announcing a moratorium on the sale of facial recognition
technology to law enforcement.86
Efforts to make policing technologies transparent and accountable to the
public do not stop at technocratic transparency, but rather force information
into the open as part of a strategy to democratize law enforcement, radically
shrink its footprint in American cities, and create community-led alternatives.87 Strategically, activists eager to reform criminal law enforcement
and reduce its footprint on American life have simultaneously harnessed
the existing framework of open government and recognized its limitations,
pushing for new and different forms of transparency and accountability.
While private vendors themselves are beyond the reach of FOIA or its state
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equivalents, freedom of information laws have proven essential in unveiling
the relationships between vendors and agencies, and in stimulating public
debate. Activists have focused a substantial amount of energy on bringing
secretive police technologies into the public eye, subjecting them to public
oversight, and questioning the legal structures that enable algorithmic
policing to thrive.
Access to information is essential to be able to evaluate the potential
value—and costs—of automated decision making in the context of criminal
law enforcement. As Bennett Capers has suggested, new technologies of
policing, and widespread surveillance in particular, may actually reduce
the kinds of racial inequality and profiling to which the Supreme Court has
historically turned a blind eye.88 And Andrew Ferguson has described how
broad systems of predictive policing might also be used to glean critical information to hold police accountable—what he calls “blue data.”89 This guarded
optimism about the potential value of algorithmic criminal law enforcement
comes with a giant caveat: It only holds if the technologies of policing themselves do not exhibit “implicit biases” or “suffer from unconscious racism.”90
Indeed, critics of these law enforcement tools see them as nothing more than
a way to cast racist policing practices in an “objective” light.91
The integral role of technology in expanding and bolstering law enforcement power underscores the limitations of a technocratic form of algorithmic
transparency. Even carefully crafted algorithmic accountability regimes are
unlikely to resolve deep-rooted concerns about whether facial recognition
algorithms are truly just or fair. The remedy that the subjects of algorithmic
policing want is usually not going to be an “explanation” of a decision, an
articulation of the general rule, or the disclosure of a data set. They want
the decision not to take place at all.92 To put it another way, democracy
requires us not only to ensure that AI systems are accountable, transparent,
explainable, ethical, and all the rest, but also to ensure that the public gets
to determine whether they are used—and how to govern them.93
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III. TOWARD A NEW
ALGORITHMIC TRANSPARENCY

ven as private technology vendors play an increasingly relevant and important role in public governance, our open-government
frameworks permit them to operate without public scrutiny. Partly
because of this transparency gap, ideals of transparency and accountability for algorithms are being reimagined by scholars and the private sector
alike. While these contributions are important and significant, they share
one major shortcoming: They fail to fully acknowledge, and therefore to
adequately protect, values of democratic participation and public governance. Practically speaking, freedom of information laws share the same
shortcomings, failing to vindicate their promise of participatory governance.
The result is a serious accountability deficit. The law must adapt to the
challenges that automated decision making poses to public transparency
and accountability. But rather than deferring to private authority or technical
measures of transparency, the law should protect structures of accountability that make real the promise of public participation and democratic
accountability.
The project of democratizing algorithms will require a renewed commitment to public oversight structures and democratic participation. We should
reaffirm the values that underpin transparency law itself—self-governance,
improving government through oversight, and free expression—as sources
of renewed democratic control. These principles point to a possible understanding of the kinds of information about automated decision-making
systems that we might require be disclosed to the public.94
For now, one concrete change would make a significant difference: the
procurement and use of proprietary algorithmic decision-making technologies
in government should be brought under democratic control. It might seem somewhat ironic to reappropriate the legal frameworks of the outsourcing process in
order to bring the rule of law to bear on automated decision making.95 But agencies, as contracting entities, are in a position to demand and enforce contractual
terms in the public interest in concrete ways.96 In light of the shrinking public
role in governing algorithms, reaffirming that public agencies ultimately set the
agenda for automated decision making is a significant step forward.
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What does that look like? Successful efforts to impose ex ante oversight
and control of police technologies are growing in number. Laws requiring
legislative approval for the acquisition of any new surveillance technology
and for the publication of impact assessments and policies on surveillance
use have been enacted in Nashville, Tennessee; Seattle, Washington; and
Cambridge, Massachusetts.97 The ACLU has drafted a model bill for ex ante
oversight of surveillance technology intended for widespread adoption.98
Naturally, these efforts have, on occasion, met with significant resistance
from law enforcement agencies.99 In the present moment, however, they
seem to be growing in number and in volume.
One recent victory deserves particular mention. In April 2020, Washington enacted a statute that forbids government agencies to “develop, procure
or use” facial recognition technology without first preparing a detailed
“accountability report”—which must be subject to public review and comment, including at least three community meetings, before being finalized.100
In theory, at least, the ex ante notice and comment framework set forth in
Washington’s law will provide ample opportunity for the public to weigh in
on potential issues with bias, accuracy, and trade secrecy for facial recognition software. In this respect, the statute parallels algorithmic impact assessments, which provide an opportunity for agencies to “engage the public and
proactively identify concerns, establish expectations, and draw on expertise
and understanding from relevant stakeholders.”101 This approach may not
be perfect. Without reform to procurement rules and practices, which allow
vendors to hide behind a veil of trade secrecy, there is no guarantee that an
“impact assessment” will tell us anything meaningful about a technology,
nor that it won’t be co-opted by the vendors it seeks to expose.102 Compared,
however, with relatively meaningless assurances from the technology sector,
this is an improvement.
At a bare minimum, statutes should limit agencies’ ability to enter into
vendor contracts that purport to circumvent open records obligations. As a
matter of public policy—and as a matter of transparency law—the prevalent
practice of contracting for secrecy is questionable at best.103 Recent legislation shows forward progress on this ground: In September 2019, Rep. Mark
Takano introduced the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act, which would
amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to bar using the trade secret privilege
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alone to prevent disclosure of evidence to criminal defendants. A similar
statute enacted in 2019 in Idaho requires pretrial risk assessment algorithms
to be “transparent,” and specifies that “no builder or user of a pretrial risk
assessment algorithm may assert trade secret or other protections in order
to quash discovery in a criminal matter by a party to a criminal case.”104
While the focus on criminal law enforcement algorithms is understandable and commendable, these initiatives do not go far enough. For one thing,
they do not even begin to address facial recognition, predictive policing,
license plate readers, or the myriad other technologies in daily use in American police departments. A more cross-cutting strategy is justifiable.
Rather than addressing trade secrecy on a piecemeal basis, reforms
to procurement policy could disfavor trade secrecy for proprietary tools
of automated decision making more broadly. As advocates at AI Now have
suggested, states and municipalities could reform the law of government
contracts to account for other social interests beyond low bids.105 Rather
than simply accepting the lowest bidder, contracting entities could consider
adherence to other important values, including openness. For instance, procurement law could be amended to provide that a contracting government
entity must consider whether a bidder relies on trade secrecy to shield its
algorithms from public disclosure. In many states, consideration of these
values would require a change to the state’s procurement law.106
Contracting entities, in considering vendors’ claims to openness, should
take into account both outright invocations of trade secrecy and proposals to
circumvent government transparency obligations. But government contracts
should also encourage vendors to commit to other kinds of open standards,
and in particular those developed through rigorous, public, multi-stakeholder processes. This strategy could borrow from the federal government’s
source-code policy (FSCP), which seeks to achieve “efficiency, transparency,
and innovation through reusable and open source software.”107 The FSCP
was intended to constrain federal agencies’ acquisition of custom-developed computer code when a viable existing federal or commercial solution
provides an alternative. Notably, the FSCP also articulates a preference for
publicly developed code and instructs agencies to “consider utilizing open
standards whenever practicable in order to increase the interoperability of
all Government software solutions.”108
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Open standards for artificial intelligence are still nascent. In 2019, an
executive order, “Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence”
(EO 13859), instructed NIST to prioritize federal engagement in the development of AI standards. NIST’s role as a venerable standards organization
bodes well for this process. Even NIST acknowledges, however, that the
technology may be too new for standards development to make sense.109
Despite this early stage, however, active government involvement in
fostering standards-setting for emerging technology makes good sense. In
this vein, policy could incentivize vendors to participate in multistakeholder
standards-setting activities to spur innovation around open standards.110
Second, new forms of proactive disclosure may be necessary to make
sense of automated decision making. In this respect, contracting agencies
might take their cue from efforts to promote open science. In 2013, the White
House issued a directive requiring agencies to develop plans for sharing data
generated from publicly funded research.111 Supporters believe that requiring data-sharing will foster open science and produce new and innovative
research.
A similar move could foster openness in automated decision making.
If procuring entities required the recipients of public funds (whether those
funds were received through grants or through contracts) to proactively
share critical information about how their technologies function, it would
not only create valuable synergies for researchers but also add some muchneeded scientific rigor to an industry that some have accused of selling pure
“snake oil.”112
Open AI development may raise security and privacy concerns.113 Similar
criticisms have been lodged against the open-data policy—scientists worry
about “rigid standards” for data-sharing, and privacy advocates are rightly
concerned about the privacy of participants in studies such as clinical trials.114 I leave for another day a discussion of the precise contours that might
or might not be appropriate here.
A third avenue, worth considering, is whether the state itself has a role
to play, not just in auditing and monitoring automated decision making, but
also in facilitating public participation. David Engstrom and Daniel Ho have
recently argued that agencies should engage in “prospective benchmarking,”
in which they would compare a random sample of decisions generated by
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AI decision-making tools against the same cases, decided by humans.115
One concern, naturally, is that agencies convinced that AI provides a more
efficient and less expensive decision-making system might be disinclined
to look closely at evidence that might undermine that belief, or to publicize
negative results. And, at least at the state and local level, it may be unrealistic to expect this level of analysis from under-resourced agencies without
much technical expertise. But prospective benchmarking might provide an
avenue through which public participation could be broadened and made
more meaningful; the results of prospective benchmarking, for example,
might be published and made subject to notice and comment, facilitating
both public understanding and participation.
Cities and states, too, can do much more to engage the public in questions about algorithmic decision making. Policies that require public notice
and comment, or community meetings before acquiring new surveillance
technologies point to one potential path forward. Cities and states can affirmatively commit to disclosing information about algorithmic systems in
current use and soliciting public input each time a new algorithmic decision
system is adopted.
One path forward is through the adoption of “AI registers.” AI registers
are essentially formats for documenting “the decisions and assumptions that
were made in the process of developing, implementing, managing and ultimately dismantling an algorithm.”116 The cities of Helsinki and Amsterdam
have both recently begun to roll out AI registers, websites that they use to
host and make available information about certain kinds of artificial intelligence systems in current use.117 In a similar development, after New York
City enacted the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology Act in 2020,
the New York Police Department began to publish impact and use policies
on its website for notice and comment for each “surveillance technology”
in use, although the information is not nearly as detailed, user-friendly, or
granular as that in the Helsinki or Amsterdam registers.118
These transparency-enhancing practices are, of course, not without cost.
Indeed, even apparently well-meaning policy interventions have sometimes
foundered simply because it is too difficult to assemble a full list of every AI
system in place. Consider the New York City Automated Decision Systems
Task Force, which was created in 2017 to “come up with recommendations
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for government use of” automated decision systems, but was stymied when
the city would not disclose which automated decision systems it was, in fact,
using.119 Despite the short-term costs, however, the long-term benefits might
include enhancing buy-in by the public and helping to air potential problems
with algorithmic systems earlier, rather than later.
Finally, civil society institutions and press outlets can play a meaningful role in ensuring that key information about automated decision making
reaches the public. In Europe, institutions such as AlgorithmWatch and the
Ada Lovelace Institute fulfill important watchdog and advocacy functions
for automated decision systems. In the United States, the closest analogue
is likely the AI Now Institute, a university-based think tank that performs
similar roles. Increasingly, specialized press outlets such as The Markup
and even Consumer Reports are also conducting investigative reporting
on algorithmic-decision systems and ensuring that vital information finds
an audience. Ultimately, increasing reliance upon automation means that
journalists, press institutions, and civil society will need to fight to ensure
public access to the new methods of governance.
Importantly, these approaches to instantiating algorithmic transparency
are neither about individual rights nor about technocratic transparency.
Instead of placing key information about how algorithms work in the hands
of auditors or agencies that cannot disclose it to the public, these public-oriented protections democratize information and share it widely.
In this sense, the proposals might come under criticism for both doing
too much and too little. Critics might fear that impediments to secrecy and
requirements for widespread disclosure would undermine competition by
discouraging vendors from investing in developing automated decision-making tools and thus ultimately stifle innovation. But—as is the case for policing—many of these vendors market their products primarily or exclusively to
the government. Companies for whom government agencies are a major customer are unlikely to be deterred by more rigorous contracting requirements.
Critics might also (rightly) suggest that information disclosure is not
enough for real accountability. Average members of the public are unlikely
to be able to make use of the disclosures I describe above. This “thin” version
of transparency, then, does not address the same concerns as a right to an
explanation or thicker accountability mechanisms might.
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Yet there are two key benefits to investing in information disclosure.
First, disclosure requirements might create a “market for expertise” that
ultimately empowers the press and civil society to engage in the kinds of
newsgathering and rigorous analysis that stimulate public oversight. 120
Already, specialized nonprofit press outlets such as The Markup, The Appeal,
and The Marshall Project are developing substantial expertise reporting on
the instruments of algorithmic governance and their impact on criminal law
enforcement.121
Second, while transparency is not sufficient to guarantee accountability—and does not inevitably lead to accountability—it is a vital precondition
to accountability-enhancing efforts. As the experience with efforts to reform
criminal law enforcement shows, the power to compel government to reveal
how police use AI is an essential part of a broader reckoning with police
power and the technology vendors that amplify it.
Information-forcing approaches, then, are an admittedly incomplete
way of addressing algorithmic accountability. But legal structures that ensure
that algorithmic governance works for the public, rather than for private
enrichment, are integral to democracy. The question of how algorithmic
governance might be made transparent thus raises broader questions both
about the role of transparency in democratic governance—and about the
role of democracy in governing algorithms.
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